areas of taxation is the personal income tax, which may have a gender-differentiated effect on work incentives and infl uence the distribution of paid and unpaid work between men and women. The paper presents an overview of the microsimulation results for selected provisions of the personal income tax system done with EUROMOD (a tax-benefi t microsimulation model for the European Union) for six selected Member States: Germany, Austria, Spain, Czech Republic, United Kingdom and Sweden.
The design of child-related tax relief is relevant from a general distributional point of view as well as from a gender perspective. A tax allowance, which reduces the tax liability by decreasing the tax base, provides increasing tax relief in the case of a progressive income tax schedule. A (wastable) tax credit that can be deducted from the tax liability avoids this degressive effect. It provides uniform tax relief independent of taxable income in absolute terms. In contrast to direct cash transfers, both instruments do not provide tax relief to low-income tax units. Non-wastable tax credits as applied e.g. in the Czech Republic and Austria avoid this problem. From a gender perspective, child tax credits are more favourable than child tax allowances with regard to distributional aspects as women earn less on average compared to men.
Excluding the Czech Republic, all Member States in the observed group applied a progressive income tax schedule in 2016, which is the base year for the microsimulations. The Czech Republic introduced a fl at income tax in 2008. Individual taxation is predominant in the observed group. The exception is Germany, which uses a joint taxation system with full income splitting. In Spain, married couples can opt for joint taxation, which implies an increased basic allowance but does not involve income splitting. The Czech Republic and Austria apply individual taxation, granting a tax relief to sole earners; the UK offers some (means-tested) tax relief for sole earner couples. Only Sweden has a strictly individualised personal income tax system. While Austria, the UK, the Czech Republic and Spain offer tax credits for children, Sweden does not grant any tax relief for children. The Austrian child tax credit is de facto designed as a universal child benefi t paid in addition to another child cash benefi t; the Czech tax credit is non-wastable; and in the UK, the child tax credit is meanstested. Germany applies a combination of a universal child benefi t paid as cash transfer to low and medium income households and a tax allowance for higher incomes. In addition to the child tax credit, Austrian families receive child cash benefi ts and can make use of a (low) child tax allowance. gressivity of the personal income tax schedule, the system of household taxation and the design of child-related tax relief.
During the last few decades, the progressivity of personal income taxation has been eroded throughout the EU.
2 Six Member States apply a fl at income tax and almost all others have dualised their income tax systems by introducing proportional and relatively low tax rates for (parts of) capital income. Labour and other incomes are still subject to progressive income tax schedules, whereby progressivity has been reduced by a long-term trend of cutting top income tax rates. Very generally, higher incomes benefi t more from such a dualisation of income taxation. Men on average benefi t more than women: due to their generally higher income levels and because capital incomes contribute a comparatively higher share to their incomes.
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Another gender-relevant trend is the individualisation of the personal income tax systems. Joint income taxation is less and less common in the EU. 4 This development has made personal income tax systems more employment-friendly 2 A. G u n n a r s s o n et al. 
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Microsimulation analyses
The results presented here were obtained using the taxbenefi t microsimulation model EUROMOD. 6 Several scenarios were simulated for each of the six EU Member States. The fi rst scenario, referred to as the Baseline (BL), represents the respective tax and benefi ts system of the policy year 2016. The other scenarios aim to assess different impacts of personal income tax elements assumed to be especially important from a distributional and gender perspective by modifying the system of household taxation (individual versus joint taxation), the design of the tax schedule (progressive versus fl at) and the design of child benefi ts (tax credits versus tax allowances versus cash transfers, respectively). In all simulations, budget neutrality is maintained to eliminate effects induced by changing the budgetary means available for a specifi c policy measure. Table 1 provides an overview of the scenarios simulated.
Individual taxation (and tax relief for sole and principal earner couples, where applicable) is replaced by joint taxation (scenarios denoted as JT) with income splitting according to the German model for Austria, Spain, Sweden, the United Scenario a: Replacing the child benefi t with a child tax credit, which is scaled up to maintain budget neutrality (ChC)
Replacing the progressive tax schedule with a fl at tax, keeping the basic tax allowance and all tax credits, maintaining budget neutrality by adjusting the tax rate (FT) Scenario b: Replacing the child benefi t with a child tax allowance, which is scaled up to maintain budget neutrality (ChA)
Austria
Replacing individual taxation of spouses with joint taxation (income splitting), maintaining budget neutrality by a proportional increase of all income tax rates (JT)
Scenario a: Replacing the child tax credit (de facto cash benefi t) with a child tax allowance, which is scaled up to maintain budget neutrality (ChA)
Replacing the progressive tax schedule with a fl at tax, keeping the basic tax allowance and all tax credits, maintaining budget neutrality by adjusting the tax rate (FT) Scenario a: Replacing the child benefi t with a child tax credit, which is scaled up to maintain budget neutrality (ChC)
Replacing the progressive tax schedule with a fl at tax, keeping the basic tax deduction and all tax credits, maintaining budget neutrality by adjusting the tax rate (FT) Scenario b: Replacing the child benefi t with a child tax allowance, which is scaled up to maintain budget neutrality (ChA)
United Kingdom
Replacing individual taxation of spouses with joint taxation (income splitting), maintaining budget neutrality by a proportional increase of all income tax rates (JT) Scenario a: Replacing the child tax credit (means-tested benefi t) with a child allowance, which is scaled up to maintain budget neutrality (ChA)
Replacing the progressive tax schedule with a fl at tax, keeping the basic tax allowance and all tax credits, maintaining budget neutrality by adjusting the tax rate (FT) Scenario b: Replacing the child tax credit (means-tested benefi t) with a non-refundable tax credit, which is scaled down to maintain budget neutrality (ChC)
Czech Republic
Abolishing the tax credit for a husband or wife with low earnings, maintaining budget neutrality by increasing the child tax credit (RMETR)
Transforming the child tax credit into a child allowance, which is scaled up proportionally to maintain budget neutrality (ChA) Scenario a: Replacing the fl at tax with a progressive tax schedule, maintaining budget neutrality (PT) Scenario b: Replacing the fl at tax with a progressive tax schedule with the option for joint taxation of spouses (income splitting), maintaining budget neutrality (JT) S o u r c e : Authors' representation.
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Kingdom and the Czech Republic. For the Czech Republic, the income tax schedule was simultaneously switched from a fl at to a progressive tax. An additional scenario denoted as RMETR is simulated for the Czech Republic in which the sole earner tax credit is abolished and the child tax credit is increased to maintain budget neutrality. For Germany, the existing income splitting system is replaced by an individual income tax system (IT). To maintain budget neutrality, all income tax rates are adjusted proportionally: downwards for Germany, upwards for all other countries.
The various child-related benefi ts instruments are used in differing designs and to a varying extent in the countries analysed. The scenarios aim at identifying the differing impact of child tax credits (ChC), child tax allowances (ChA) and child-related cash transfers. For those countries relying solely (Sweden) or primarily (Germany) on a child cash benefi t, we apply two alternative scenarios each: the replacement of the existing child cash benefi t by a child tax credit and by a child tax allowance. For the UK, a fi rst scenario substitutes the existing means-tested child tax credit by a non-refundable child tax credit, while a second one replaces it by a child tax allowance. For Austria, the existing child tax credit is replaced by a child tax allowance in a fi rst scenario; a second scenario substitutes the existing child tax allowance with a new child tax credit. For both the Czech Republic and Spain, the current child tax credit is replaced by a child tax allowance.
The progressive income tax schedule is replaced by a fl at schedule maintaining existing tax exemptions for Austria, Spain, Sweden, the UK and Germany (denoted as FT), and the inverse for the Czech Republic (PT). To maintain budget neutrality, the fl at income tax rate is adjusted accordingly.
Results
The microsimulations focus on horizontal distributional effects of the simulated reforms differentiated across different household types and on their gender effects. We consider distributional impacts as well as work incentives for second earners, who are mainly women whose labour supply is relatively responsive to (tax-induced) variations in net wages. The effects presented here are aggregate effects and do not offer any differentiations across socio-economic characteristics such as, for example, age, income levels, number of children or a migration background.
Effects on poverty and inequality Table 2 contains the changes of estimated at-risk-ofpoverty rates for the individual scenarios in percentage points compared to the baseline scenario. The changes in Gini coeffi cients measuring income inequality are depicted in Table 3 .
Overall, the simulations suggest that the changes in the income tax system -from a fl at tax to a progressive income tax system and vice versa -have negligible effects on poverty. For the lowest income groups, it is primarily the basic allowance that determines their tax burdens (which is maintained in the simulations), while the tax rate matters to a far lower extent.
The Gini coeffi cient increases as a consequence of the introduction of a fl at tax in all countries considered, indicating an increase in income inequality that results from a general decrease in the progressivity of income tax systems; however, depending on the progressivity of the current income tax schedules, the extent to which it increases may vary greatly. The increase is more pronounced in Austria and Germany, where income tax schedules are rather progressive, while it is moderate in Spain and the UK and almost zero in Sweden. The reintroduction of a progressive income tax schedule in the Czech Republic decreases the Gini coeffi cient moderately and thus reduces income inequality.
The impact of substituting the existing systems of individual taxation for a joint taxation system with income splitting has little effect on poverty. As low-income households have low to no taxable incomes, their overall tax burden is hardly affected by the system of household taxation.
Introducing individual taxation in Germany slightly increases the estimated overall poverty rate. This increase is driven by a relatively large increase in the poverty rate of households in which only one of the spouses earns an active income -as these are the greatest benefi ciaries of joint taxation. The Gini coeffi cients at the household level indicate an overall decrease in income inequality in all fi ve countries currently applying a system of individual taxation. Conversely, applying a system of individual taxation in Germany slightly increases income inequality. Within households, income inequality is likely to decrease, benefi ting second earners (mostly women); how-Forum cash benefi t) and increasing the tax allowance for children would signifi cantly raise poverty and slightly increase income inequality; while the replacement of the existing child allowance by a child tax credit has almost no effect due to its very low level. Transforming the non-wastable child tax credit into a child allowance in the Czech Republic increases poverty and income inequality. In Spain, the overall effect of replacing the family tax credit for children with a tax allowance on poverty and inequality is negligible.
Replacing the means-tested child tax credit (which is a de facto means-tested cash benefi t) with a child allowance or a non-refundable child tax credit would considerably raise poverty and income inequality in the UK. Both reforms benefi t primarily the upper half of the income distribution. The increase of inequality is higher in the case of the child allowance as the tax credit primarily strengthens the (upper) middle part of the income distribution, while the tax allowance has the strongest effect on incomes at the top of the distribution. The choice between a child tax allowance and a non-refundable child tax credit does not signifi cantly affect poverty rates.
For Sweden, the simulation suggests that replacing a universal child benefi t with a child tax allowance increases inequality even more than substituting it for a child tax credit, as higher incomes benefi t more from a child tax ever, our simulations do not allow for any conclusions in this respect.
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Generally, our simulations show the expected distributional effects of the various child benefi ts. Most pronounced are the changes in at-risk-of-poverty rates, while the Gini coeffi cients are only slightly affected. The extent of the effects crucially depends on the current design of income taxation (in particular the degree of progressivity of the income tax schedule), on the absolute levels of (tax-related) child benefi ts and the design of the system of child benefi ts, which makes the effects' extent less comparable across countries. However, the simulations provide insights into the general direction of the expected impact of different changes within the system of child benefi ts.
Replacing a child cash benefi t with tax-related child benefi ts, as in the scenarios simulated for Sweden and Germany, increases poverty and income inequality. The simulations for Austria demonstrate, in a similar vein, that abolishing the existing child tax credit (which is a de facto Forum allowance due to their higher marginal tax rates. A similar result is found for Germany.
Gender aspects
Gender-differentiated distributional effects
EUROMOD is based on the household as a standard unit, thus assuming that all individuals in a household are pooling resources and are equally affected by policy measures: an assumption that does not hold in reality. 9 The distributional impact of changes in tax and benefi t policies may differ between men and women within a household and certain household types in which women or men are over or under-represented (e.g. households consisting of lone parents -typically lone mothers) may be affected disproportionately by specifi c measures. To identify gender-differentiated distributional effects, Avram, Popova and Rastrigina suggest a two-pronged strategy: a decomposition approach and distributional analyses focusing on certain household types in which men or women are over or underrepresented. 10 The scope of our analyses allows for the pursuit of the second approach only, i.e. to analyse the distributional impact of the various scenarios on specifi c household types that are particularly interesting from a gender perspective. Specifi cally, it is possible to simulate distributional effects for one-person households, i.e. single men and women as well as lone mothers and fathers, also differentiating between one-person households where the adult is actively employed versus households where they are inactive. Moreover, it is possible to identify the distributional effects of two-person households with both different constellations regarding the main income contributor (male or female) and differentiating between households with and without children. These analyses only allow comparisons between different household types (i.e. whether a specifi c policy measure affects specifi c household types more or less than others). As with all methods based on households and resource pooling, analyses of intra-household distributional effects are not possible.
To determine whether a given household type benefi ts overall from a simulated reform, we look at the changes of the aggregate tax burden (i.e. whether it is decreased or increased by the reform), compared to changes in aggregate transfer payments received by this household type. A given household type is a winner if its overall tax burden is reduced and the reduction is not or only par- tially compensated by a decrease in transfer payments received, and vice versa. For the sake of simplicity, we do not present the detailed amounts for all household types here, but only highlight the winning and losing household types. This simplifi cation comes at the cost of neglecting quantitative (gender-differentiated) effects: as this approach does not inform about the relative size of the gains or losses affecting individual household types, it cannot provide insight into the possible (gender) differences regarding the extent of gains or losses. In the following, we present the simulated effects of changing the system of household taxation in the countries looking at income distribution and work incentives from a gender perspective.
Introducing joint taxation with income splitting benefi ts couple households with one active income contributor in Austria, the UK, Sweden (with the exception of households with female active income contributors with children) and Spain regardless of the existence of children and regardless of whether the active income contributor is male or female (see Table 4 ). Conversely, couple households with one active income contributor lose in Germany as a result of the introduction of individual taxation, regardless of the existence of children. The only exception is households with female active contributors without children, who benefi t from the reduction of income tax rates. In a similar vein, all single households (with and without children, active and inactive) gain from the lowering of income tax rates that the introduction of individual taxation would allow in a budget neutral scenario.
Single men and women as well as lone fathers and mothers face losses in the joint taxation scenario, in which single person households suffer from the increase in tax rates in Austria, Spain and the UK. Again, the impact of the introduction of income splitting has minimal overall and gender-differentiated effects in Sweden.
Not taking into account the intra-household perspective and the magnitude of change, the gender differentiated effects of substituting individual taxation for joint taxation with income splitting are almost non-existent in couple households with one active income contributor.
Impact on work incentives
In addition to its re-distributive effect, by altering gross incomes the tax benefi t system also affects the (dis)incentive to work. This leads to potential labour supply reactions especially for those less attached to the labour market, i.e. the second earners who are predominantly women. In order to analyse the incentive to work of the tax benefi t systems of the six EU Member States and the vari-
Forum
The analysis focuses on households where a woman is either a second earner or inactive. Figures 1 and 2 give an overview of the estimated distributions of METRs for female second earners and PTRs for inactive women in the baseline scenario as well as in the system of household taxation scenario.
In the baseline scenario, METRs for second earners on average are highest for Germany (a result of the income splitting system) at 48%. In the other fi ve countries, average METRs for second earners range between 22% (Spain) and 36% (Austria). The mean PTR is highest in Austria and Germany (37%). In Sweden, the Czech Republic and the UK, it ranges between 29% and 35%; it is by far at the lowest level in Spain (18%).
The introduction of a joint taxation system with income splitting in Austria, Spain, Sweden and the UK increases the mean METR for female second earners and thus decreases work incentives on average. In the Czech Republic, for which the income splitting was implemented jointly with a progressive tax schedule, the average METR slightly increases compared to the baseline (+3 percentage points) and signifi cantly increases compared to the progressive tax scenario (+19 percentage points). ous scenarios, we use two indicators: the marginal effective tax rate (METR) and the participation tax rate (PTR).
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The METR measures the extent to which taxes, social insurance contributions and benefi ts affect the fi nancial gain from work when the labour supply increases at the intensive margin. The higher the METR, the less fi nancially rewarding it is to expand working hours for individuals already in employment. The PTR measures how transitioning from non-employment to employment affects a household's disposable income. It thereby infl uences the decision to enter the labour market or not.
Both indicators are subject to assumptions about the level of increase in individual gross earnings. When calculating the METR, we assume an increase in earnings of 10%. For the PTR, the gross earnings of inactive individuals are set to two-thirds of the mean active income. We further assume year round employment. Germany ( N o t e : "+" winner, "-" loser, "0" no effect; "*" interpret with caution due to small sample size, "x""data not published due to unreliable survey estimates as a result of less than 20 reporting households. JT joint tax rate scenario, RMETR reduced marginal effective tax rate scenario.
S o u r c e : Authors' representation based on EUROMOD simulations.
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Replacing the German income splitting system with individual taxation results is a sizeable improvement in work incentives. T he mean (-12 percentage points) and median (-13 percentage points) METR decrease considerably.
The substitution of the system of individual taxation by joint taxation with income splitting considerably reduces the average PTR for inactive women in Austria; a moderate reduction is observable in Sweden and a slight one in the Czech 
Republic. It results in an increase, however, in Spain (moderate) and the UK (considerable). Overall, therefore, the effects are not as clear as those on METR, indicating a deterioration of work incentives for inactive women for Spain (slightly) and the UK, but improvements in Austria, Sweden and the Czech Republic. Substituting the current income splitting system in Germany by individual taxation reduces the average PTR for inactive women, thus improving incentives for inactive women to enter the labour market.
Conclusions
Our simulations show that the design of income tax schedules, systems of household taxation and (tax-related) child benefi ts has non-negligible effects on income distribution and on work incentives in general -particularly from a gender perspective -in the six EU Member States considered. General tendencies and effects can be identifi ed although the effects differ for some household types across countries and depending on the concrete design of the tax benefi t system and the interactions between tax and benefi t provisions that cannot be captured in our simulation exercise.
The introduction of a fl at tax hardly impacts poverty but increases income inequality. Gender-differentiated effects are less clear-cut and their extent differs across countries.
In general, a fl at tax benefi ts couple households with a male active income contributor, while households with female active income contributors lose. Rather pronounced gender differences are also found between active lone mothers and fathers. While in almost all countries active lone mothers lose from the introduction of a fl at tax, active lone fathers are winners.
Replacing individual taxation with a joint taxation system with income splitting has only small effects on poverty but decreases income inequality on a household level. It benefi ts couple households with one active income contributor in almost all countries, regardless of the existence of children and regardless of the gender of the active income contributor. Gender-differentiated effects are almost nonexistent in childless couple households with one active income contributor. They are a little more pronounced in the presence of children, due to larger income differences between spouses in these households.
Replacing an existing child benefi t granted as a cash transfer by tax-related child benefi ts raises poverty and income inequality. Moreover, the inequality-and poverty-increasing effect of a child tax allowance would be higher compared to a child tax credit. Gender-differentiated effects are not clear-cut, however, and require deeper analyses.
